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ABSTRACT. One of the most influential views in privacy scholarship is that
privacy protects individual autonomy. On the early liberal view, the exercise of
autonomy requires detachment from social and political life and privacy facilitates
it. This view of privacy still informs current legal and political practice. As this
view of privacy presupposes a tension between privacy and society, it is respon-
sible for the underrating of privacy in legal and political practice. Over the last
decades, liberal reflection on autonomy has shifted from the early liberal under-
standing of autonomy as calling for detachment from social life to the idea of
autonomy as socially embedded. This development has brought about a corre-
sponding adjustment in the liberal concept of privacy: privacy has come to be seen
as a social rather than merely an individual interest. The social turn in thinking
about privacy has gone a long way to change the problematic image of privacy in
legal and political practice. It has not gone far enough, however, to draw con-
clusions regarding the political relevance of privacy. I argue that we should
understand autonomy as politically embedded. Revised along these lines, privacy
has a political value: when we claim privacy, we do not make a claim to withdraw
from political life, but rather make a claim to protect certain forms of political
engagement.
When it comes to addressing issues of privacy protection, public dis-
course as well as policy-making and legal practice lean on the tradi-
tional liberal view of privacy. This view of privacy, first articulated in
the works of, by now classic, privacy scholars such as AlanWestin and
Stanley Benn,1 has its source in specifically liberal ideas defending
individual rights against the claims of the collectivity as such.2 On this
1 Westin (1967) and Benn (1984).
2 Galison and Minow (2005, p. 278) and Cohen (2013, pp. 1904–1907).
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view, privacy is seen as a shield protecting individual autonomy.3
Privacy protects the individual interest in autonomy because it carves
out a space around individuals in which they can direct their lives as
they see fit irrespective of social and political pressures: informational
privacy restricts access to an individual’s personal data by setting limits
to the acquisition, possession and spread of information about her;
decisional privacy removes personal commitments and choices from
interference by the state and society at large.
This view of privacy presupposes a tension between privacy and
society. For this reason, the association of privacy with individual
autonomy has resulted in the underrating of privacy in policy-
making and legal practice. As Kirsty Hughes observes in her analysis
of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the
association of privacy with individual autonomy has done poor
service to privacy in actual legal practice.4 In cases in which privacy
conflicts with other values such as public security or freedom of
speech, privacy understood as the protection of individual autonomy
has little political pull: whereas public security or freedom of speech
are perceived by the court as essential interests of a democratic
society, an autonomy-based interest in privacy denotes a merely
personal interest similar to other individual interests lacking of
political relevance such as ‘physical and psychological integrity’ and
‘personal development’.5 In effect, protecting individuals’ privacy
against political interests in freedom of speech or security seems to
be a luxury that society can ill afford. Similar observations drive
Daniel Solove’s remarks:
The interests aligned against privacy—for example, efficient consumer transaction,
free speech, or security—are often defined in terms of their larger social value. In
this way, protecting the privacy of the individual seems extravagant when weighed
against interests of society as a whole.6
Commenting on recent public debates on privacy protection in Great
Britain, Annabelle Lever observed that insisting on protecting
individual interests in privacy against freedom of speech is even seen
3 Privacy has also been associated with other individual interests: dignity, material well-being,
reputation, self-development, bodily integrity, capacity to pursue intimate relations (for overview:
Solove, 2008).
4 Hughes (2015).
5 Hughes (2015, pp. 232, 237, 241).
6 Solove (2008, p. 89).
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as a threat to democratic society.7 In a nutshell, the classic liberal
understanding of privacy has given privacy a bad name. As Julie
Cohen put it:
Privacy has an image problem. Over and over again, regardless of the forum in
which it is debated, it is cast as old-fashioned at best and downright harmful at
worst – anti-progressive, overly costly and inimical to the welfare of the body
politic. (…). Privacy’s bad reputation has deep roots in privacy theory (…) which
is infused with the commitments of liberal political theory, first and foremost of
which is a conception of the self as inherently autonomous.8
In this paper, I explore the image problem haunting privacy in
political and legal practice and contend that liberal discourse on
privacy has sufficient resources to address it. Since Westin’s and
Benn’s writings, liberal reflection on autonomy has undergone
important changes, which, in turn, forced modifications to the
concept of privacy. This conceptual development, if taken far en-
ough, can pave the way to a new understanding of privacy capable of
changing the problematic image of privacy prevailing in current legal
and political practice. In particular, I argue that it enables us to
conceive an autonomy-based interest in privacy as a political rather
than merely an individual interest.
Although the body of work exploring various dimensions of pri-
vacy is considerable, a systematic reflection on what is politically at
stake in protecting the private sphere in which individuals exercise
their autonomy has been rare. We can regularly encounter remarks
linking privacy to various instruments by means of which political
relations are pursued,9 but they fail to sufficiently explore the nexus
between political relations, privacy, and individual autonomy. My
argument intends to push the liberal privacy discourse forward in
this respect.
I proceed as follows. I briefly recall the early liberal concept of
autonomy that informed the classic liberal privacy discourse such as
explicated in the views of Westin and Benn. I indicate the way the
liberal concept of autonomy has since been revised. Of particular
importance here is the liberal shift from the early liberal under-
standing of autonomy as calling for detachment from social life to
the idea of autonomy as socially embedded. This shift in the liberal
7 Lever (2015, p. 162).
8 Cohen (2013, pp. 1904, 1906–1907).
9 See Sect. II.
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concept of autonomy has brought about a corresponding adjustment
in the liberal concept of privacy. Privacy has come to be seen as a
social rather than merely an individual interest, a view that resonates
in the recent turn in thinking about the social dimensions of privacy.
Scholars endorsing this perspective have done important work to
demonstrate that privacy stands on an equal footing with social
interests in, for example, public security or freedom of speech.10 One
reason why privacy still struggles with an image problem is that
these developments have not been taken far enough to draw con-
clusions regarding the political relevance of privacy. To fill this gap
in liberal privacy discourse, I extend the argument from the social
embedding of autonomy to the context of political life, arguing that
autonomy is not only socially embedded, but also politically
embedded. Just as the social embedding of autonomy defies the
image of privacy as deprived of social relevance, so, I submit, the
political embedding of autonomy defies the image of privacy as
deprived of political relevance.
I. AUTONOMY AND PRIVACY IN LIBERAL DISCOURSE: FROM SOCIAL
DETACHMENT TO SOCIAL EMBEDDING
The liberal self that privacy protects is defined in terms of its capacity
for autonomy. In the classic form of this view, autonomy is pre-
sented as negative liberty: an absence of external social and political
constraints on behavior. Privacy protects individuals’ autonomy so
understood because it facilitates their detachment from social roles,
relations, practices and institutions in which they live and act.
Conceptualized as ‘a right not to participate in collective life’,11
privacy preserves a space around individuals that shelters them from
societal and political pressures. We find this early liberal view of
privacy in Alan Westin’s classic definition of privacy: ‘Viewed in
terms of the relation of the individual to social participation, privacy
is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from the
general society’.12 Another articulation of this idea is Clinton Ros-
siter’s:
10 See essays included in Roessler and Mokrosinska (2015).
11 Emerson (1970, p. 549).
12 Westin (1967, p. 7).
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Privacy (…) can be understood as an attempt to secure autonomy (…), if nec-
essary in defiance of all the pressures of modern society. (…). It seeks to build an
unbreachable wall (…) against the entire world. The free man is a private man, the
man who (…) feels no overriding compulsion to share everything (…) with
others.13
The view of privacy attached to the early liberal view of auton-
omy as social detachment pits individual interest in autonomy
against social and political interests. So understood, privacy has no
social or political value. One the one hand, the benefits that privacy
confers on individuals appear to be socially and politically irrelevant
as they are bestowed on individuals disengaged from social and
political life. On the other hand, privacy may have a social and
political disvalue as it makes it possible for individuals to withhold
information relevant to the pursuit of those benefits we traditionally
associate with society, such as law enforcement, public security and
implementation of social justice.14
Whereas this early liberal view of privacy still informs legal and
political practice, it has been contested in liberal discourse. The
liberal idea of autonomy as detachment from social life clashed with
developments in the social sciences which emphasize the social
nature of the self.15 As these empirical findings have come to inform
philosophical reflection, the attack on the early liberal concept of the
autonomous self has been mounted from several theoretical angles.
Thus communitarianism pointed out that individuals’ identities
contain an essential reference to their social position and identifica-
tion with others viz. gender, race, culture, religion, national identity,
citizenship.16 Feminism, criticizing the overly individualistic charac-
ter of the early liberal model of an autonomous self, emphasized the
formative power of personal and social relationships.17 The thrust of
these arguments has been the following: given that (1) autonomy is
the ability to direct one’s actions from within values and commit-
ments central to one’s identity, and (2) people’s identities are con-
stituted by a variety of social roles, relations and practices then (3)
the exercise of autonomy cannot demand detachment from social
13 Rossiter (1958) in: Westin (1967, p. 34).
14 Communitarians endorse this line of critique when they argue that privacy allows escaping the
obligations of social life (Etzioni, 1999).
15 Cohen (2012, p. 110).
16 Sandel (1982).
17 MacKenzie and Stoljar (2000).
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life. Detachment from those social elements central to one’s identity
would alienate one from one’s core commitments and, hence,
undermine one’s autonomy.
In response to these arguments, liberals have dropped the idea
that autonomy and social life are antithetical. They have come to
emphasize the social and interpersonal dynamics that shape the
exercise of autonomy and acknowledge that social roles, relations
and practices such as those related to gender, race, religion or na-
tional identity are a condition of individual autonomy.18 These
developments in the liberal discussion of autonomy have resonated
in the liberal discourse on privacy. Privacy scholars have acknowl-
edged the need for revising the concept of privacy along the lines of
the revised concept of autonomy.19 Recognizing that autonomy
presupposes patterns of social interdependence, they have come to
argue that privacy protects autonomy by protecting the integrity of
those social patterns. On this view, privacy does not secure
detachment from social life, but rather protects social engagements
that make autonomy possible.
Julie Cohen’s and Beate Roessler’s works are examples of recent
attempts at reconceptualizing the classic liberal concept of privacy.20
Cohen distances herself from the early liberal view of the autono-
mous self. ‘The liberal self who is the subject of privacy theory and
privacy policy-making’, she says, ‘does not exist’.21 Drawing on Irwin
Altman, Cohen argues that the self emerges through processes of
social interaction.22 As the autonomy of such a socially constructed
self cannot be conceived separately from the social contexts forming
18 See, for example, Kymlicka (1989), for a redefinition of autonomy in response to such challenges.
19 See, for example, Schoeman (1992), Regan (1995), Inness (1992), Allen (1999), Roessler (2005),
Steeves (2009), Cohen (2012, 2013), Roessler and Mokrosinska (2013) and DeCew (2015).
20 Cohen (2013), Roessler (2005) and Roessler and Mokrosinska (2013). An early revision of the
classic liberal view of privacy is present in the work of Schoeman (1992). Schoeman argues that
autonomy is an opportunity to participate in various social groups. Autonomy is threatened if the
individual’s membership in one group is threatened by social pressure applied on her by virtue of her
membership in another group. Privacy protects autonomy by ensuring that social control exercised by
social groups remains compartmentalized, i.e., kept internal to the particular association exerting it. By
ensuring that an individual’s membership in one association is not threatened by social pressure applied
on her by virtue of her membership in another, privacy empowers the individual to live by values
rooted in social settings of her own choosing.
21 Cohen (2013, p. 1905).
22 Altman (1975).
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it, privacy cannot protect autonomy by separating the self from
society:
Within contemporary social theory, the separation between self and society (…)
does not exist. From that perspective, a robust theory of privacy requires an
understanding of the process by which selfhood comes into being and is negotiated
through contexts and time.23
Roessler’s discussion of privacy provides an example of how the
traditional liberal concept of privacy can be adjusted to accommo-
date the idea of the social embedding of autonomy. In Roessler’s
view, family and intimate relations are among social practices that
are formative of an autonomous self. From this perspective, saying
that privacy protects autonomy is to say that privacy also protects
the practices in which the agent exercises her autonomy. Hence,
besides privacy of individuals, we should also speak of privacy of
relations; in the particular context of Roessler’s discussion, the object
of privacy is not only the individual but also the family and intimate
relationships in which an individual develops and exercises her
autonomy.24 In further discussion of the link between social relations
and privacy, Roessler and Mokrosinska, drawing on the account of
relational privacy developed by Fried and Rachels,25 argue that pri-
vacy not only protects but also constitutes social relations that are a
condition of autonomy:
Social roles and practices create and provide a social framework in which the
exercise of autonomy becomes meaningful. Privacy, by regulating social roles,
practices and relations, facilitates the social conditions of the meaningful exercise
of autonomy. (…). [P]rivacy [is] also necessary for the constitution (…) of social
roles, relationships and (…) social practices [that make the exercise of autonomy
possible].26
Cohen’s and Roessler’s views, while significantly different, move
away from the early liberal view of privacy, according to which
privacy protects an individual’s autonomy by securing individual
detachment from social life. What their arguments make clear is that
if individual autonomy is socially embedded, then it makes no sense
to say that privacy protects autonomy by isolating the individual
from her social contexts. We should rather say that privacy protects
23 Cohen (2012, p. 114).
24 Roessler (2005, pp. 133–134).
25 Fried (1968) and Rachels (1975).
26 Roessler and Mokrosinska (2013, pp. 779, 774).
PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY 123
autonomy by protecting the social contexts which make the exercise
of individual autonomy meaningful.27
Current legal and political debates on privacy lag behind these
developments in liberal privacy discourse. This is unfortunate given
that the concept of privacy revised along these lines answers the
concerns regarding the social irrelevance of privacy voiced in those
debates. Whereas the early liberal view of privacy implied a tension
between individual privacy and social life, no such tension is in-
volved in the view of privacy revised along the lines of the modified
liberal concept of autonomy. First, to the extent that privacy protects
social practices that are the condition of autonomy, it is not the case
that privacy and social life are antithetical. Second, it is not the case
that privacy is deprived of social relevance. In protecting social
practices, privacy facilitates forms of social life. And if, as Roessler
and Mokrosinska argue, privacy not merely facilitates but also con-
stitutes social contexts, then the role of privacy for society is not only
of an instrumental, but also of a constitutive character.28 In both
cases, privacy has social value:
[p]rotecting individual privacy means not only that the rights of individuals are
protected, but also that different forms of social interaction are safeguarded. Be-
sides its value for individuals, privacy also has an irreducibly social value.29
So far I have sketched the development in the liberal reflection on
autonomy and explored its impact on the liberal discourse on pri-
vacy. Privacy, understood along the lines of the revised idea of
individual autonomy, protects the social engagements of individuals
rather than disengages them from social life. In the next section, I
want to explore the link between privacy and autonomy in the
political domain. My claim is that autonomy presupposes patterns of
political interdependence and that privacy protects autonomy by
protecting the corresponding political practices.
27 There is important work in recent privacy scholarship that emphasizes the social dimension of
privacy but does not make use of the socialized concept of autonomy. Instead, it focuses on, for
example, the relevance of context, spaces, bodies and relationships in explaining the social value of
privacy, cf. Rachels (1975), Regan (1995), Inness (1992), Allen (1999), Nissenbaum (2010), Cohen (2013)
and Steeves (2009). As my argument in this essay focuses on the link between autonomy and privacy, I
will not discuss them here.
28 Mokrosinska (2014, pp. 371–372).
29 Roessler and Mokrosinska (2013, p. 772).
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II. TOWARD A POLITICAL ACCOUNT OF PRIVACY
Until relatively recently the role of privacy in political life has been
rather neglected by privacy scholars. In particular, the social turn in
thinking about privacy as constitutive of social conditions of
autonomy has not yet found its political counterpart in privacy
discourse.
Most existing defenses of privacy in politics emphasize that pri-
vacy arrangements facilitate various instruments by means of which
political relations are pursued. For example, according to Thomas
Nagel, privacy norms take disruptive issues off the political agenda,
which helps secure the peaceful character of the political decision-
making process.30 Ferdinand Schoeman has pointed to the role pri-
vacy plays in maintaining the integrity of political associations.31
Many have followed Annabelle Lever’s claim regarding the role of
privacy in facilitating political participation of socially vulnerable
groups, who, due to a historically or socially disadvantaged position,
are uncomfortable with the existing forms of political expression.32 A
number of scholars have argued that the exercise of privacy creates
conditions for the enhancement of independent political judgment
and in this way contributes to the formation of citizens’ political
preferences and reasoned political discourse.33 In this context, Helen
Nissenbaum has reminded us that privacy is built into the voting
process in the form of secret ballots. Privacy serves the purpose of
voting in that it forestalls attempts to influence the electoral choice
of voters and ensures that voters’ electoral choices reflect their
genuine preferences.34
According to these arguments, what is politically at stake in
protecting the private domain in which individuals exercise their
autonomy is the efficiency of political participation and decision-
making processes. Yet, as defenses of the political role of privacy,
these instrumental arguments are weak. First, the political role they
ascribe to privacy is contingent upon the historical and cultural
conditions of specific societies, such as the existence of socially dis-
30 Nagel (1998).
31 Schoeman (1992).
32 Lever (2005, p. 15) and Roberts (2015, pp. 339–340).
33 Gavison (1980), Simitis (1987, p. 734), Cohen (2000, pp. 1426–1427), Regan (1995, p. 225), Lever
(2005, p. 15) and Roberts (2015, p. 339).
34 Nissenbaum (2010, pp. 176–177).
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advantaged groups or the practices of voter manipulation. Such
features are characteristic of some societies but not others and, thus,
it is not clear whether privacy plays this instrumental role in all
liberal-democratic societies. Moreover, the political status they as-
cribe to privacy is provisional. Privacy does not have a political status
on its own but only as a way of facilitating forms of political par-
ticipation and decision-making. If other and better ways to secure
these aims were found, no political reasons for privacy protection
would be needed.
Given the contingent and provisional status these arguments as-
cribe to privacy in political life, the question arises whether a more
solid ground for the political value of privacy can be found. Few
privacy scholars have moved beyond the instrumental approach to
privacy in politics and argued that privacy is implicated in the fun-
damental commitments of a democratic state. One notable example
is Annabelle Lever. According to her, what is politically at stake in
protecting privacy is democratic equality.35 Especially relevant in the
context of my argument is a recent defense of the political value of
privacy proposed by Andrew Roberts.36 According to his account of
privacy, what is politically at stake in privacy protection is political
autonomy viz. citizens’ self-governance. Roberts places his argument
in the republican tradition. He argues that privacy protects auton-
omy understood as freedom from dominating power. One form of
dominating power, he argues, is possessing information about per-
sons. From this perspective, privacy is a condition of autonomy
because it enables individuals to control what information about
them can and cannot be accessed and collected. Without such
control, self-governance is impossible. Roberts also offers an inter-
esting argument to the effect that privacy is an intrinsically political
norm. On his view, people can exercise control over access to
information about them, in other words, they can be autonomous,
only if they ‘themselves define the boundary between the public and
the private spheres’.37 A collective determination of the boundary
between the private and the public is predicated upon people’s
participation in political decision-making processes that settle the
norms governing access to information among them. Hence, privacy
35 Lever (2012, 2015).
36 Roberts (2015).
37 Roberts (2015, p. 337).
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is an intrinsically political norm in that its scope and content is the
product of political processes that engage citizens.38
Just as Lever, Roberts makes a strong case for the political role of
privacy by arguing that privacy is of an intrinsic rather than merely
of an instrumental value for political life. Below I argue that a liberal
account of privacy can provide us with an equally strong case for the
political value of privacy. Extending the liberal argument that pri-
vacy is constitutive of social autonomy, I argue that privacy is con-
stitutive of political autonomy of citizens in a liberal democracy. I
situate my argument in political liberalism. Following political lib-
erals, I argue that, (1) autonomy is anchored in the practice of public
justification, which I explain below. In previous work, I have argued
that, (2) privacy is implicated in the concept of public justification.39
Drawing on these two points, I argue that privacy preserves the
conditions of individual autonomy by preserving the integrity of
political practices governed by public justification.
III. POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICAL EMBEDDING OF
AUTONOMY
Autonomy means self-governance: people are autonomous if they
live their lives according to their own reasons. To be autonomous in
the political domain means to be subject only to such policies and
laws that we can endorse as our own. Under conditions of pluralism
that characterize modern societies, however, the possibility of
autonomy so understood is not self-evident. People in our societies
often disagree about what policies and laws our societies should
adopt. If you propose laws and policies that I cannot accept as my
own (or vice versa), my autonomy is in danger: if laws are adopted
that I cannot endorse as my own, I am not self-governing (or vice
versa). Is individual autonomy possible under conditions of plurality
and disagreement?
The question of how autonomy is possible under conditions of
pluralism and disagreement is the main challenge for political liberals
to resolve. They phrase the problem in Kantian terms: disagreement
is a moral problem because it undermines the equal moral freedom
of individuals. When there are several competing conceptions of the
38 Roberts (2015, p. 337).
39 Mokrosinska (2014).
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good in the community, unilateral enforcement by an individual of
her favored view is inevitable. However, such a unilateral imposition
infringes on the equal freedom of those who hold competing
views.40 If we want to make sure that people live autonomous lives,
political liberals argue, we need to organize political life according to
the principle of public justification.41 Public justification requires that
whenever we decide what laws and policies to adopt we must appeal
to arguments that can be accepted by all: it refers to principles that
are neutral between different moral views about the good life that
divide citizens. As Charles Larmore puts it, public justification refers
to ‘principles of association which individuals have reason to affirm
together despite deep substantial disagreements setting them
apart’.42
Not every personal view of the good life, not every lifestyle,
commitment, or action, and not every piece of personal information
has a place in the political realm governed by public justification.
Some lifestyles and commitments, for example, religious beliefs,
concern issues that are objects of irresolvable controversy. Bringing
such contentious issues into the spotlight of public attention and
judgment would provoke disagreement and, thereby, destroy rather
than establish common ground. Exposing information meant to
bring such personal commitments to collective attention would have
a similar effect. To establish common ground, the material brought
under collective attention should allow the people concerned to find
principles with which to conduct their lives together and bypass their
disagreements. Therefore, the liberal commitment to public justifi-
cation constrains the material that individuals and groups acting in
their political capacity can bring to the attention of others. Firstly,
this commitment limits the considerations that individuals might
wish to employ in deciding matters of mutual concern (for example,
when casting votes in elections or asserting group demands on
common resources) to considerations which others could reasonably
accept. Secondly, it requires that individuals engaged in the processes
of decision-making which concern the organization of their life to-
gether refrain from asserting claims in terms that others could not
accept. Public justification is, then, a practice of mutual restraint:
40 Gaus (1996, pp. 182–184).
41 Waldron (1993, pp. 57–58) and Rawls (1996).
42 Larmore (2003, p. 380).
DOROTA MOKROSINSKA128
Free and equal individuals affirm the political principles that con-
strain them.
By defining the political realm in terms of public justification,
political liberals address the danger which the fact of pluralism and
disagreement poses to individual autonomy. In requiring public
justification for principles governing political life, liberals ensure that
only those laws and policies are adopted that can be accepted by all.
In ensuring that all are governed by laws that they themselves can
endorse, public justification ensures that all are self-governing. In
that sense, public justification is a condition of autonomy in the
political domain.
I have argued so far that autonomy in the political domain is
anchored in the practice of public justification. We can exercise
autonomy in the political domain only if we participate in the
practice of public justification: only if each of us, in deciding matters
of mutual concern, restrains ourselves from appealing to reasons that
others cannot accept can each of us remain self-governing. Now I
want to return to the question of privacy. I argue below that privacy
protects autonomy because it is involved in the practice of self-
restraint in public justification. Conceptualizing privacy in terms of
public justification presents privacy as an inherently political norm;
seeing it as a condition of political autonomy enables us to see it as a
political interest. This approach may provide a stronger basis for
privacy protection than the traditional liberal view prevailing in
current legal and political practice.
IV. PRIVACY: PROTECTING POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF AUTONOMY
Based on the understanding of public justification outlined above,
the commitment to public justification in politics rules out certain
personal commitments and actions as objects of mutual interference
among individuals acting in their political capacity. Similarly, it rules
out certain personal information as an object of mutual scrutiny. On
pain of endangering politics as common ground, such material, and
the corresponding information, should be withheld or, if known, left
unacknowledged. In sorting out what material is appropriate or
inappropriate for individuals to introduce into the political forum so
that each can retain an equal degree of self-governance, public jus-
tification sets out rules of concealment and disclosure between
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individuals acting in their political capacity. Insofar as this requires
that individuals withhold certain personal material, I submit, political
association based on public justification involves privacy arrange-
ments. Insofar as these rules prescribe that personal commitments,
views of the good life and lifestyle be kept off the political domain
and not scrutinized or interfered with, they are decisional privacy
arrangements. Insofar as they prescribe that certain personal infor-
mation be kept off the political domain and not be monitored, they
are informational privacy arrangements. In other words, the material
that public justification requires us to keep out of each other’s faces
is private for the purposes of political life. Privacy, understood as
mutual restraint on access and self-disclosure, is the flip-side side of
public justification.43
V. HOW MUCH PRIVACY DOES POLITICAL AUTONOMY REQUIRE?
I have argued that, (1) public justification is a condition of autonomy
in the political domain, and that, (2) privacy is the flip-side of public
justification. If we accept these arguments, then we are committed
to the conclusion that, (3) privacy, as the flip-side of public justifi-
cation, is the condition of political autonomy exercised by liberal
citizens. What must remain private between individuals in order to
ensure that each is self-governing in the liberal political realm?
The scope of privacy needed to ensure that each individual is
subject only to such laws that she can accept reflects the scope of the
material that public justification relegates off the political realm. In
other words, the material that fails public justification identifies the
material that should be kept private for the sake of preserving the
political autonomy of each. Unlike the traditional view, the realm of
privacy so designated is not defined in terms of any substantial
concerns, such as home or domestic life; rather, it is constructed out
43 Brettschneider (2007) resorts to the idea of public justification in order to account for the right of
privacy. In his view, however, privacy is not a requirement of public justification, but a prima facie right
that exists prior to political life and, thus, prior to the principle of public justification (2007, p. 75). It is
the boundaries of this pre-political right to privacy that are determined in the process of public
justification. On my view, privacy is a requirement of public justification. This position makes my
account of the political value of privacy stronger than Brettschneider’s. First, I claim below that privacy,
as the flip-side of public justification, is a condition of liberal legitimacy, the claim that Brettschneider
stops short of making. Second, I claim that privacy is both a political duty and a political right whereas
Brettschneider (2007, p. 84) is critical about conceiving privacy as a duty. For a yet different account of
privacy in terms of public reasons see Cohen (2002, pp. 52–57), who adopts a Habermasian framework.
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of reasons that people cannot reasonably accept as governing their
life together.
What people can and cannot reasonably accept is a matter of well-
known controversy among liberals. However, there is a consensus
that one fails public justification if one rejects the aim of pressing one’s
claims on others in terms of reasons that others could accept. Claims
that fail public justification in this way are, in the liberal idiom,
unreasonable.44 What is unreasonable, then, frames the domain that
should be held back from the political forum and privatized. Generi-
cally, all views that deny the equal status and freedom of some (groups
of) individuals fall into this class. Race and gender discrimination are
examples of unreasonable commitments and actions. Incapable of
organizing common life, such views should be confined to private
quarters. Appealing to such views in political arguments injects
material into the political realm that undermines the integrity of the
political realm as common ground and violates political autonomy
predicated on public justification. The privatization of the unreason-
able is a version of the liberal tolerance paradox: just as the commit-
ment to equal freedom commits liberals to tolerate the intolerant as
long as their intolerant views are kept off the political realm,45 so it
requires them to tolerate the unreasonable as long as their unrea-
sonable views are kept off the political realm and do not influence it.
Above I have identified one class of material that fails public
justification and should be kept private if people are to exercise
autonomy in the political domain. However, failures of public jus-
tification are not confined to renouncing the aim of justification, and
so the scope of privacy required for the sake of political autonomy is
broader than the one sketched so far.
A person may strive to justify her claims to others but fail
nonetheless. This is the case when the justification offered appeals to
beliefs that others, who adhere to different worldviews, cannot be
expected to endorse. For liberals, substantive claims failing public
justification in this way should not be invoked in the political deci-
sion-making process. Their proper place is the privacy of personal or
associational life but not the realm of liberal citizenship. In effect,
many substantive beliefs and commitments, important though they
44 Rawls (1996, p. 49).
45 Rawls (1971, p. 220).
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are to people’s self-understanding, will be depoliticized and set aside
as private issues. Exactly what material is depoliticized and set off as
private depends on the model of public justification one endorses.
There are two general approaches to public justification.46 In the
first approach, public justification is a constraint on the content of
reasons to which individuals can appeal in the political domain; it
admits only those substantive views upon which all reasonable
worldviews could converge.47 The substantive views that divide
individuals fail the public justification test and should be set aside as
private:
When you and I learn that we disagree about one or another dimension of the
moral truth, we should say nothing at all about this disagreement and put the
moral ideas that divide us off the conversational agenda of the liberal state. In
restraining ourselves in this way, we need not lose the chance to talk to one
another about our deepest moral disagreements in countless other, more private
contexts.48
On this content-oriented model of public justification, in a society
characterized by pluralism and disagreement, religious beliefs are
granted the status of privacy: given that they are the subject of
disagreement, they fail the public justification test. Appealing to
them in political arguments threatens the political autonomy of
those who do not share them and injects material into the political
realm that undermines the integrity of the political realm as
common ground.49 Privacy, then, insulates religious beliefs from
public exposure, scrutiny, and interference. The same holds for other
material about which people, who adhere to different worldviews,
can disagree, such as sexual morality.
One qualification is in order. The de-politicization of substantive
views about which citizens disagree could be taken to suggest that
all disagreement is privatized in liberal politics. This is not the case.
What is privatized and relegated off politics is an appeal to reasons
that others cannot accept and not all cases of disagreement are of
46 Chambers (2010)
47 Ackerman (1989).
48 Ackerman (1989, p. 16). Emphasis changed.
49 Liberals qualify this claim in various ways. For example, Rawls allows comprehensive doctrines
about which citizens disagree to enter the political domain provided that, in due course, the policies
they support are supported by properly public reasons (Rawls, 1997, pp. 783–787). Audi, who focuses on
religious beliefs, allows religious appeals if they are backed up by sufficiently motivating, generally
acceptable reasons which he identifies with secular reasons (Audi, 2000, pp. 75–78).
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that sort. Now it is possible that people disagree but appeal to
mutually acceptable reasons. The disagreement arises here from
what Rawls calls the burdens of judgment: due to the complexity
of the evidence or the variety of life experiences that bear on
judgment, individuals may interpret, apply, and rank reasons dif-
ferently.50 Insofar as individuals formulate their conflicting posi-
tions in terms of reasons that all sides can accept, reasonable
disagreement properly belongs to the political domain. A classic
example is the disagreement about abortion. If pro-life and pro-
choice advocates formulated their claims in terms of reasons that
their adversaries could not accept, for example, in terms of reli-
gious or metaphysical claims about the status of the fetus, the
disagreement about abortion, on the logic of political liberalism,
would be relegated off the political domain and privatized. Yet, as
long as both pro-life and pro-choice advocates formulate their
claims in terms of reasons that their adversaries can accept viz. the
value of life and the value of freedom respectively, it properly
belongs to the political domain.
Whereas the first model of public justification sets a constraint on
the content of reasons, the second model sets a constraint on the
process of reasoning whereby citizens arrive at substantive political
decisions. What material is excluded from the political forum de-
pends on how people engage with each other’s arguments and re-
spond to them. As Cristina Lafont, an exponent of this approach,
argues, what material is let into or out of the political forum depends
on (1) whether objections based on public reasons are advanced
against appealing to it in political decision-making processes, and (2)
whether there is any convincing way to answer these objections.51
For example, Lafont argues, citizens can publicly advocate a ban on
same-sex marriage on the basis of religious reasons against homo-
sexuality, provided that they address any objections against such a
policy based on the political value of equal freedom. Unless next
time around they are willing to have their freedom diminished, they
must come up with a convincing explanation of how is it that the
ban on marriage they propose is an acceptable policy as regards the
group of homosexual citizens but not others.52 In this procedure-
50 Rawls (1996, pp. 54–58).
51 Lafont (2009, p. 132).
52 Lafont (2008).
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oriented model of public justification, then, citizens cannot deter-
mine in advance what material is and is not capable of justification;
that depends on which reasons have survived the scrutiny of public
deliberation. Correspondingly, the scope of privacy is not deter-
mined in advance either. Thus, appeals to religious beliefs in advo-
cating a ban on same-sex marriage are depoliticized and set off as
private only if those citizens advancing religious reasons against
homosexuality fail to answer objections that such a policy violates
equal freedom. If no objections are raised, or if the objections are
answered convincingly, introducing them into the political decision-
making process does not endanger others’ autonomy and the polit-
ical rationale for privatizing these issues is absent.
The scope of liberal privacy depends, then, on the model of public
justification one endorses. Whereas I have no space to engage in a
comprehensive comparative assessment of the two models, I would
like to suggest one reason for favoring the procedure-oriented over
the content-oriented model of public justification as an anchor of
liberal privacy. The reason is that the former better addresses the
critiques of privacy in a liberal state launched by feminist scholars.
The feminists have argued that the liberal postulate of neutrality
and the duty to refrain from opening political discourse to certain
questions and arguments can be used to keep off the political agenda
matters that embody and perpetuate existing inequalities. One
sphere that liberals traditionally declared off the political domain is
the sphere of domestic life; given the disagreements regarding var-
ious models of family life, the commitment to public justification
seemed to commit liberals to privatizing it. Starting with Catherine
MacKinnon’s powerful critique, feminists have argued that, by
marking this domain as private, liberal privacy serves male power
and conceals women’s exploitation and abuse.53 The view of privacy
I have reconstructed in political liberalism seems to fuel this feminist
critique in yet another way: I have argued that the material that
counts as private from the perspective of liberal politics is identified
by its failure to pass the test of public justification. Given that gen-
der-based discrimination with its denial of the equal status of women
53 MacKinnon (1989, pp. 161–162). The thrust of her critique was that the private domain should be
rejected and collapsed into the public realm, eliminated or ‘‘exploded’’ (MacKinnon, 1989, p. 191). Other
feminists insisted that the boundaries between the private and the public should be redrawn (Allen,
1988; Roessler, 2005; DeCew, 1997).
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cannot pass the public justification test,54 it would be relegated off
the political domain and classified as private. The feminist could
argue that this argument, in granting privacy protection to sexists, is
a plea to create a protected haven for sexists so that they discriminate
against women without disruption.
My response to these concerns is twofold. First, I argue that
liberals are not committed to privatizing the domestic sphere as long
as they endorse the procedure-oriented model of public justification.
Second, I argue that, independently of the model of public justifi-
cation they endorse, they are not committed to privatizing the
practices of abuse and violence.
With respect to the status of domestic life in a liberal state, the
concern is that given the disagreement on the models of family life,
the commitment to public justification would commit liberals to
privatizing the domestic sphere of life. The privatization of this
sphere would conceal and perpetuate its sexist practices of abuse and
violence. While this critique applies to the content-oriented model of
public justification (though, as I argue below, privatizing domestic
life would not imply privatizing the abuse and violence it may
happen to involve), it does not apply to the procedure-oriented
model of public justification. On this latter model of public justifi-
cation whether domestic life is privatized depends on (1) whether
any views regarding domestic life are advanced in the political for-
um, (2) whether they meet with objections based on public reasons,
and (3) whether these objections are convincingly answered. This
political set-up invites feminists to stage in the political forum their
critiques of the existing patterns of domestic life and to propose ways
to address the wrongs they involve.55 If they succeed in providing a
public reasons defense of their critique and proposals for reform, not
only is the sphere of domestic life not privatized, but the feminist
cause to address the wrongs present in the domestic sphere is ad-
vanced rather than thwarted.
I have argued, against the feminist critiques, that liberals are not
committed to privatizing the sphere of domestic life. I want to argue
now that even if the domestic sphere were privatized, this would not
imply that the abuse and violence it may happen to involve would be
54 Rawls (1997, p. 771) and Hartley and Watson (2010, p. 7).
55 Brake (2004, pp. 306–309).
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privatized too. First, in the spirit of John Stuart Mill’s harm princi-
ple,56 liberals are prepared to allow the state to interfere with the
individual’s private domain in order to prevent harm that he causes
to others. Thus, insofar as adherence to sexist commitments
engenders domestic violence, private sexism can become a matter of
political concern. Second, recall that liberals ascribe priority to
political rights and duties over other social commitments that indi-
viduals may have.57 Given their priority over other commitments, a
violation of political rights cannot be justified in terms of other social
commitments. This means that private sexism can become a matter
of public concern when it involves violations of others’ political
rights or leads to discrimination in the political sphere.58 In this spirit,
Linda McClain points out that the liberal state can intervene to
secure women’s equal citizenship and basic liberties. She refers to
antidiscrimination laws such as the Violence Against Women Act
which properly protects women against ‘private’ violence.59
I have argued that the liberal model of political relations involves
privacy arrangements. Privacy as the flip-side of public justification is
a means to ensure that each individual acting in her political capacity
is autonomous, that is, only subject to such laws that she can accept.
The scope of privacy that protects political autonomy reflects the
model of public justification and I have argued that adopting the
procedure-oriented model has advantages over the content-oriented
model. Before drawing implications regarding the political status of
privacy so understood, two more comments regarding the scope of
liberal privacy are in order.
First, the circumstances in which the norms of privacy obtain
correspond to the range of application of public justification. On the
classic Rawlsian approach, the requirement of public justification is
limited to ‘constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice’.60
Others, like Larmore, claim that the rationale for public justification
requires applying public justification to the issues of daily politics.
Given that the point of public justification is to legitimize the use of
coercion to those subject to it, almost all state action is in need of
56 Mill (2003, p. 68).
57 Rawls (1996, pp. 30–31), Larmore (1990, pp. 349–351) and Hartley and Watson (2010, p. 20).
58 Hartley and Watson (2010, p. 20).
59 McClain (1998, p. 110).
60 Rawls (1996, 227–230).
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public justification, since almost all state action is backed by coercive
power.61 Whereas I cannot discuss this position here, I will endorse it
for the remainder of the essay. Adopted for the purposes of my
argument, this position implies that the norms of privacy are binding
across an equally broad political spectrum.
Second, as with public justification, the norms of liberal privacy
do not bind individuals in the non-political sphere of what Rawls
calls the ‘background culture’ of civil society, that is, the culture of
‘daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities, learned
and scientific societies, and clubs and teams’ and professional
groups.62 As long as individuals act in civil society, unreasonable and
comprehensive personal beliefs failing the public justification test
need not be kept private (they may be public with respect to the
members of a given group or association who share them). In the
non-political domain of civil society, individuals’ autonomy is not
protected by the political account of privacy I outline in this essay. In
that regard, theories of privacy, such as Cohen’s or Roessler’s, which
focus on the domain of social life broadly conceived rather than
specifically on its political realm, may apply.
VI. AUTONOMY AND THE POLITICAL VALUE OF PRIVACY
I have said that the undervaluing of privacy in current legal and
political practice has its source in the concept of autonomy tradi-
tionally associated with privacy. In this essay I have explored the
contours of a revised view of privacy that responds to this concern.
Placing my argument in the conceptual framework of political lib-
eralism, I have provided an example of how we can amend the
concept of autonomy associated with privacy so that we can im-
prove privacy’s image in policy-making and legal practice.
The concept of privacy I have developed retains the link between
privacy and individual autonomy that is at the core of the classic
liberal view of privacy. However, against this classic view of
autonomy, I have argued that autonomy does not involve a
detachment from political life. To the contrary, autonomy means
engagement in political life viz. the practice of public justification.
This means that when we claim privacy by way of protecting our
61 Quong (2013) referring to Larmore (1999).
62 Rawls (1996, p. 220).
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autonomy, we do not make a claim to withdraw from political life,
but rather make a claim to protect certain forms of political
engagement. On this argument, unlike on the traditional liberal view
of privacy, privacy does not undermine political association, but
instead actually facilitates it.
The revised view of privacy calls into question the lower status
that current political and legal practice grants to privacy as compared
to other values such as public security or freedom of speech. Policy-
making and legal practice rest on the assumption that privacy has no
political value because it marks an individual interest deprived of
political significance or even opposed to interests typically associated
with political society. Having argued that privacy is the flip-side of
public justification, I have shown this assumption to be unfounded.
Given that the practice of public justification is the condition of
political autonomy and given that privacy protects the practice of
public justification, it is not the case that privacy and political life are
antithetical, but just the opposite: privacy has a political function. My
argument, of course, does not deny that privacy may conflict with
other interests such as public security or freedom of speech. What it
makes clear, however, is that the balance between privacy and public
security or freedom of speech is not determined in favor of the latter
because, just as public security or freedom of speech, so also indi-
vidual privacy may be protected for the sake of political society
rather than at its expense.
I close my argument by drawing attention to the normative status
of privacy in political practice. I have argued that privacy, under-
stood as a condition of mutual restraint on access and self-disclosure,
is the flip-side of public justification. Public justification invests pri-
vacy with a normative dimension. First, given that public justifica-
tion ensures that individuals are self-governing in the political
domain, privacy is a right that individuals have in virtue of their right
to self-governance that privacy, as the flip-side of public justification,
realizes. It is a right to have others refrain from accessing certain
material about us (for example our religious beliefs) and a right to
have others refrain from disclosing similar material about them-
selves. Second, privacy is also a duty. The duties that privacy im-
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poses upon us correlate to the rights it establishes: they are duties to
refrain from accessing certain material about others (for example
their religious beliefs) and duties to refrain from disclosing similar
material about ourselves when acting in our political capacities.
Recall in this context that political liberals tie the concept of public
justification to a duty that falls on individuals as members of political
societies. Rawls speaks here of a ‘duty of civility’, which is a moral
duty grounded in equal freedom: individuals have to explain to one
another how the principles and policies they advocate can be sup-
ported by reasons which everyone can reasonably accept.63 If, as I
have argued, privacy is implied in public justification, then respect
for privacy is an aspect of that duty.
Does this imply anything about enforcement of privacy norms?
Public justification, which ensures that individuals subject to polit-
ical power remain autonomous, is not merely a consideration for
individuals, groups, and institutions to take into account when
acting in the political realm; it is the condition of political legiti-
macy.64 Indeed it is a condition of the political realm more generally
because for liberals, the lack of public justification characterizes the
non-political condition of a state of nature: ‘The moral flaw of the
state of nature (…) is that we act without [public] justification’.65
The constitutive role of public justification and individual autonomy
in the political order can be seen as an argument in favor of the
legal enforcement of the constraints that public justification imposes
on action in the political realm. That privacy is the flip-side of
public justification argues in favor of the legal enforcement of pri-
vacy norms.
Insisting on the mandatory character of privacy and its legal
enforcement is a departure from mainstream liberal privacy dis-
course.66 The resistance of liberal privacy scholars to understanding
privacy in terms of a (legally enforceable) duty follows from con-
ceptualizing privacy with reference to individual autonomy viz.
63 Rawls (1996, p. 217).
64 Waldron (1993, pp. 57–58) and Rawls (1996, p. 217).
65 Gaus (1996, p. 182). See also Wall and Klosko (2003, p. 10).
66 Only Allen (1999) defends this position, but the phrasing of her defense in terms of privacy
paternalism has been criticized as inconsistent with the otherwise liberal dimensions of her account of
privacy, see Roessler (2013, p. 15).
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individual will, intentions, or desires as when privacy is understood in
terms of control over access,67 unwanted access, or desired inacces-
sibility.68 The thought is that as long as privacy is a matter of an
exercise of autonomous will, intentions or desires, it can be auton-
omously waived; if it can be waived in the exercise of autonomous
agency, it cannot be the subject of a (legal) duty and enforcement.
This liberal resistance to conceptualizing privacy as a duty is not
entirely justified however. Conceptualizing privacy with reference to
individual autonomy does not imply that the degree of access to the
individual and her self-disclosure is entirely a matter of the individual
will, intentions or desires. Earlier in the essay, I called attention to the
fact that liberals are prepared to place restrictions on the agent’s au-
tonomous action if that action harms other agents. This argument is
relevant in the present context: given that our privacy practices can be
worrisome because of the harm they do to others, placing restrictions
upon the individual’s will, intentions and desires regarding the content
and scope of her privacy can be justified. This argument is particularly
compelling when we understand privacy as having social or political
value because in this context individual privacy violations affect not
only the individual herself but social relationships and practices upon
which her privacy is predicated. Roessler recognized this point when
discussing reasons for privacy enforcement in the context of personal
information disclosures on social network sites:
If I publish everything about myself in a lifelog (…) it might also be harmful to
myself; however, this would not, in itself, be a sufficient reason to stop me from
my publishing activities. A good liberal reason to stop me from doing so would be
if I harmed others in their freedom and autonomy.69
A similar argument holds for the political account of privacy I
have developed. I argued that individuals can exercise autonomy in
the political domain only under conditions of mutual restraint on the
material they introduce to the political domain. Privacy, as mutual
restraint on access to information about ourselves and about others,
and as mutual restraint on self-disclosure, is the flip-side of autonomy
so understood. The interdependence built into the idea of political
autonomy means that privacy cannot be unilaterally waived without
67 Westin (1967), Moore (2013) and Roessler (2005).
68 Moreham (2005).
69 Roessler (2013, p. 18).
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undermining the autonomy of others. A unilateral abandonment of
privacy (for example, unilateral disclosure of and appeal to one’s
religious commitments in political argument) would harm others’
interests in autonomy. In the light of this argument, liberals, in the
spirit of Mill’s harm principle, are committed to make privacy an
object of (legal) duty and enforcement.
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